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Non-excludable public good experiments

Cason, Timothy N. and Saijo, Tatsuyoshi and Yamato, Takehiko and Yokotani, Konomu (2004) Non-excludable public good experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 49 (1). pp. 81-102. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.002. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-133015514

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Abstract

We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject’s commitment decision, subjects who did not commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributing nothing increased as periods advanced; that is, the free-riding rate declined over time. Furthermore, this behavior did not arise due to altruism or kindness among subjects, but from spiteful behavior of subjects.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.002DOIUNSPECIFIED
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825604000065PublisherElsevier
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-170555282Related ItemSSWP 1154
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Cason, Timothy N.0000-0001-9581-5015
Additional Information:© 2004 Elsevier Inc. Received 2 June 1999, Available online 13 February 2004. We thank Takenori Inoki, Mamoru Kaneko, Hajime Miyazaki, Toru Mori, Mancur Olson, Mitsuo Suzuki, two anonymous referees, and Economic Science Association conference participants for their helpful comments and discussions. This research was partially supported by the Zengin Foundation for the Studies on Economics and Finance, Grant in Aid for Scientific Research 08453001 and 15310023 of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan, the Tokyo Center for Economic Research Grant, and the Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation. Formerly SSWP 1154
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)08453001
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)15310023
Zengin Foundation for the Studies on Economics and FinanceUNSPECIFIED
Tokyo Center for Economic ResearchUNSPECIFIED
Japan Securities Scholarship FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Laboratory; Fairness; Spite; Social preferences; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Hawk–Dove game
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL: D70; C90; H41
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.002
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-133015514
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-133015514
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82984
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Nov 2017 21:44
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:54

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