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Repeated Implementation

Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O. (1998) Repeated Implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 83 (2). pp. 308-317. ISSN 0022-0531. doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2459.

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In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem:" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

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URLURL TypeDescription ItemEarlier version published as Social Science Working Paper 1027
Additional Information:© 1998 by Academic Press. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Received December 18, 1997; revised June 15, 1998. The authors thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Formerly SSWP 1027.
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New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASAUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83009
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Nov 2017 17:59
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:54

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