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Repeated Implementation

Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O. (1998) Repeated Implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 83 (2). pp. 308-317. ISSN 0022-0531. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759

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Abstract

In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem:" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2459DOIUNSPECIFIED
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053197924595PublisherElsevier
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-163520727Related ItemEarlier version published as Social Science Working Paper 1027
Additional Information:© 1998 by Academic Press. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Received December 18, 1997; revised June 15, 1998. The authors thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Formerly SSWP 1027.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSBR-955421
New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASAUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83009
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Nov 2017 17:59
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:01

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