A Caltech Library Service

Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners

Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1991) Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1). pp. 163-181. ISSN 8756-6222.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


Professional income tax preparers account for over half of all individual income tax returns filed and an even greater proportion of complex returns filed (Jackson and Milliron). Of these preparers, a significant proportion are qualified to represent clients before the Internal Revenue Service. The American Bar Association Commission on Taxpayer Compliance refers to these individuals as tax practitioners: "Like preparers, practitioners can prepare and sign returns, but the term is used to distinguish them from preparers who cannot represent clients during Internal Revenue Service audits and other enforcement actions" (56). Practitioners can provide a variety of services in addition to tax preparation; they "are often consulted by taxpayers facing audits, may accompany or represent clients during the audit itself, may participate in appeals of audit decisions within the IRS and in court, and may negotiate tax payment arrangements" (Kinsey:1). Practitioners can also play a role in identifying strategies for minimizing tax liability (Klepper and Nagin).

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1991 by Oxford University Press. This paper is a revision, extension, and substantial redirection of "Tax Practitioners and Tax Compliance," Social Science Working Paper No. 666, California Institute of Technology, March 1988. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of National Science Foundation Grants SES-8903157 (Reinganum) and SES-8902545 (Wilde), and thank two referees for helpful comments.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:Taxpaying, Taxes, Tax audits, Fees, Revenue, Income taxes, Net income, Tax noncompliance, Cost functions, Tax revenues
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-073943162
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Reinganum, Jennifer F., and Louis L. Wilde. “Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 7, no. 1, 1991, pp. 163–181, JSTOR,
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83052
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:08 Nov 2017 18:27
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:01

Repository Staff Only: item control page