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The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement

Graetz, Michael J. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1986) The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1). pp. 1-32. ISSN 8756-6222.

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Additional Information:© 1986 by Yale University. We would like to thank Kim Border, Jules Coleman, Alvin Klevorick, Stan Koppleman, and members of the workshops at Boston University Law School, Caltech, and Yale and anonymous referees for helpful comments. The financial support by National Science Foundation Grant nos. SES-8315422 and SES-8420681 is gratefully acknowledged (by Reinganum and Wilde). Formerly SSWP 589.
Subject Keywords:Taxpaying, Tax audits, Taxes, Tax noncompliance, Low income, High income, Budget constraints, Income taxes, Economic models, Aggregate income
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-144541279
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83163
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Nov 2017 00:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:03

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