Bates, Robert H. and Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald (1985) A note on taxation, development, and representative government. Politics & Society, 14 (1). pp. 53-70. ISSN 0032-3292. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-153938001
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Abstract
Revenue-seeking governments may well find it to their advantage to strike bargains with citizens whose assets they seek to tax. To induce a greater willingness to pay taxes, they may defer to the citizens’ policy preferences. Such bargains may become more beneficial from the citizens’ point of view the more mobile the assets the citizens hold. These claims form the central themes of this paper.
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1985 SAGE. Research for this article was supported by The National Science Foundation (Grant no. SES82-16870). Our special thanks to Philip Hoffman. Formerly SSWP 567. | ||||||||||||
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| Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-153938001 | ||||||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-153938001 | ||||||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
| ID Code: | 83169 | ||||||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||||||||
| Deposited On: | 15 Nov 2017 23:55 | ||||||||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 19:03 |
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