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Sequential elections with limited information

McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1986) Sequential elections with limited information. Social Choice and Welfare, 3 (3). pp. 199-211. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/BF00433535.

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We develop an incomplete information model of a sequence of elections in a one-dimensional policy space, where voters have no contemporaneous information about candidate positions, and candidates have no information about voter preferences. The only source of information is contemporaneous endorsement data and historical data on the policy positions of previous winning candidates. We define a notion of “stationary rational expectations equilibrium”, and show that such an equilibrium results in outcomes which are equivalent to those that would occur under full information.

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Additional Information:© Springer-Verlag 1986. Received February 15, 1985; Accepted June 9, 1986. We acknowledge support from ISF Grant #SES 82-08184 and #SES 84-09654. Reprinted in American Journal of Political Science Vol. 29, No. 3 (Aug., 1985), pp. 480-512. Formerly SSWP 530.
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Issue or Number:3
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83193
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Nov 2017 23:31
Last Modified:01 Jun 2023 22:26

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