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Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model

McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1987) Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model. Mathematical Social Sciences, 14 (1). pp. 77-99. ISSN 0165-4896. doi:10.1016/0165-4896(87)90016-3.

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We develop a game-theoretic model of two-candidate competition over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of other participants. The players consist of the voters and the candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and candidates alike) observe contemporaneous poll data broken-down by various subgroups of the population. The results of the paper give conditions on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) extracts all information.

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Alternate Title:Elections with limited information: A multi-dimensional model
Additional Information:© 1987 Elsevier. Communicated by K.H. Kim. Received 28 April 1986. We acknowledge support from NSF grant #SES 8208184. Formerly SSWP 529.
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Subject Keywords:Elections; incomplete information; candidate competition; rational expectations
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-135844777
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83194
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Nov 2017 23:29
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:56

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