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Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions

Strnad, Jeff (1987) Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16 (1). pp. 17-37. ISSN 0304-4068. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-151808798

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Abstract

This paper characterizes neutral social functions that are fully implementable. A neutral social function must be monotonic and simple to be fully implementable under either the Nash equilibrium concept or the strong Nash equilibrium concept. If a neutral social function is monotonic and simple, then the social function is fully implementable by a set of Nash equilibria. For finite alternative sets a neutral social function will be fully implementable by a set of strong Nash equilibria if and only if it is monotonic, simple and dictatorial.


Item Type:Article
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https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90019-XDOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/030440688790019XPublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-132224090Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1987 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland). Accepted October 1986. This article is derived from a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, Strnad (1982). I have profited greatly from the suggestions and guidance of Donald Brown in this work. Richard McKelvey, the referee of this journal and participants at the 1984 Public Choice Society Annual Meeting in Phoenix and at the California Institute of Technology Economic Theory Workshop made valuable comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility. Substantial financial support for this work has been provided by Summer Research Grants for 1981 and 1982 from the University of Southern California Law Center. Formerly SSWP 500.
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University of Southern California Law CenterUNSPECIFIED
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-151808798
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ID Code:83206
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Nov 2017 23:11
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:03

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