CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in European coalition governments 1945-83

Schofield, Norman and Laver, Michael (1985) Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in European coalition governments 1945-83. British Journal of Political Science, 15 (2). pp. 143-164. ISSN 0007-1234. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-140905962

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-140905962

Abstract

Coalition formation has been the subject of much theoretical work in the past decade or so. The theories that have been way or another, upon assumptions about the ways in accruing to a particular coalition is distributed among its less empirical work has been done on the process of payoff some of the fundamental assumptions of coalition theories, at their practical application to coalition governments, have tested. Several theories of payoff distribution have been however. It is the purpose of this article to test the application theories to the practice of coalition government in Europe. We begin by looking in more detail at the role of payoff theories formation. We then review both the theoretical and coalition payoffs, especially those payoffs denominated in posts. This sets the scene for a comparative testing of three proportional payoffs, the bargaining set and the kernel, in terms of each theory to predict portfolio payoffs in twelve post-systems. This study is conducted both on a general and a basis, since past analyses have demonstrated that differences are at least as significant as those between theories.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400004130DOIArticle
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/bargaining-theory-and-portfolio-payoffs-in-european-coalition-governments-194583/BA224D3175D531256F558256116C9EB4PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-152153125Related ItemWorking Paper
http://www.jstor.org/stable/193798JSTORArticle
Additional Information:© 1985 Cambridge University Press. University research was supported by a Nuffield Foundation grant on political contribution was written while he was a Hallsworth Fellow in Political University and then a Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the Technology. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Meeting, Helmsholm, Denmark, April 1983. Thanks are due to Ian Budge, Großman for their comments and for making available their unpublished Bowler for his research assistance. Formerly SSWP 490.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Nuffield FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Political parties, Bargaining theory, Coalition bargaining, Government cabinets, Liberalism, Game theory, Coalition governments, Bargaining power, Multiple regression, Social democratic parties
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-140905962
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-140905962
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83231
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Nov 2017 23:00
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:03

Repository Staff Only: item control page