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Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources

McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1985) Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. Journal of Economic Theory, 36 (1). pp. 55-85. ISSN 0022-0531. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-170626266

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Abstract

A one-dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested. Candidates do not know voter utility functions, and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions. A fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined, using poll and endorsement data as information sources. It is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters, any equilibrium extracts all available information: all participants—voters and candidates alike—act as if they were fully informed. For fixed candidate strategies, a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium, and this process is shown to imply a “bandwagon effect.”


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053185900791PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-152708822Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1985 Academic Press, Inc. Received 31 January 1983, Revised 14 September 1984/ We acknowledge support of NSF Grant SES82-08184. We thank Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder for discussions which stimulated this research, and Gary Cox and John Ledyard for helpful comments. Formerly SSWP 434.
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Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-8208184
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-170626266
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-170626266
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83247
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Nov 2017 18:15
Last Modified:16 Nov 2017 18:15

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