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Continuum and finite-player noncooperative models of competition

Green, Edward J. (1984) Continuum and finite-player noncooperative models of competition. Econometrica, 52 (4). pp. 975-993. ISSN 0012-9682. doi:10.2307/1911194.

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The anonymous interaction of large numbers of economic agents is a kind of noncooperative situation which is markedly different from small-numbers strategic conflict. The nonatomic game has been introduced as a model for these many-agent situations. This paper contains a precise definition of what it means for a nonatomic game to be the limit of a sequence of finite-player games, and a theorem which states when the limit of equilibria of finite-player games will be an equilibrium of the nonatomic limit game. This is analogous to theorems prompted by Edgeworth's conjecture in core theory.

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Additional Information:© 1984 The Econometric Society. I would like to thank Marcus Berliant, Donald Brown, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ariel Rubenstein, Hugo Sonnenschein, and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. Formerly SSWP 418.
Subject Keywords:Mathematical vectors, Topology, Economic theory, Game theory, Topological spaces, Topological theorems, Statistical theories, Mathematical functions, Economic models, Mathematical theorems
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-142209931
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83262
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Nov 2017 22:32
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:56

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