Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1983) Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative. Journal of Economic Theory, 30 (1). pp. 139-152. ISSN 0022-0531. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90097-2. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-145207219
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Abstract
In a recent paper, Weitzman (Econometrica 47 (1979) 641–654) described a policy of “optimal search for the best alternative.” The present paper is concerned with the development and characterization of a policy of “Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative.” Specifically, it is shown that, under certain monotonicity assumptions, and under the assumption that firms have incomplete information regarding the results of rivals' search behavior, a Nash equilibrium search policy exists and has the same form as Weitzman's optimal search policy.
Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
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Additional Information: | © 1983 Academic Press, Inc. Received March 12, 1982. I would like to thank Kim Border and Ed Green for very helpful discussions, and the National Science Foundation for financial support. Errors and opinions expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the author. Formerly SSWP 413. | ||||||||||||
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Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90097-2 | ||||||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-145207219 | ||||||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-145207219 | ||||||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
ID Code: | 83264 | ||||||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||||||||
Deposited On: | 16 Nov 2017 23:08 | ||||||||||||
Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 19:56 |
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