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Oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource: The importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games

Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Stokey, Nancy L. (1985) Oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource: The importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games. International Economic Review, 26 (1). pp. 161-173. ISSN 0020-6598. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-164654448

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Abstract

The theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization - for example, questions about resource extraction, advertising, research and development, investment in new capacity; and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved. However, an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game. The issue is the appropriate formulation of the players' strategy spaces.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2526532DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526532JSTORArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-160021410Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1985 Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania. Manuscript received October, 1983; revised March, 1984. This work was supported by an IBM Research Professorship and by the Center for Advanced Study in Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University. Formerly SSWP 377.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
IBMUNSPECIFIED
Northwestern University Center for Advanced Study in Managerial Economics and Decision SciencesUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Nash equilibrium, Dynamic games, Economic models, Nonrenewable resources, Joint ownership, Oligopolies, Resource ownership, Economic commitments, Financial investments, Economic externalities
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-164654448
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-164654448
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83273
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:17 Nov 2017 23:22
Last Modified:18 Nov 2017 01:38

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