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Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information

Green, Edward J. and Porter, Robert H. (1984) Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica, 52 (1). pp. 84-100. ISSN 0012-9682. doi:10.2307/1911462.

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Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.

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Additional Information:© 1984 The Econometric Society. We have accepted the generous help of many colleagues in the course of this research. We would particularly like to thank C. Berry, T. Bresnahan, J. Friedman, J. Mirrlees, S. Salop, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Willig. Robert Porter's research received support from a Sloan Foundation grant to the University of Minnesota Economics Department. Formerly SSWP 367.
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Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Collusion, Cartels, Nash equilibrium, Market prices, Industrial market, Shipping industries, Estimators, Ergodic theory, Markov processes, Industrial concentration
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-140712553
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83298
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:17 Nov 2017 22:33
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:57

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