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Voters, bureaucrats and legislators: A rational choice perspective on the growth of bureaucracy

Fiorina, Morris P. and Noll, Roger G. (1978) Voters, bureaucrats and legislators: A rational choice perspective on the growth of bureaucracy. Journal of Public Economics, 9 (2). pp. 239-254. ISSN 0047-2727. doi:10.1016/0047-2727(78)90045-2.

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The claim that government is excessively bureaucratic can be interpreted as an assertion about inefficient factor proportions in the production of public goods. The rational choice theory of electoral competition is extended in this paper to include the election of representatives from separate districts, ombudsman activities by legislators, self-interested bureaucrats and production functions for public activities that have bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic arguments. If the demand for public goods grows exogenously through time, the model predicts increasingly inefficient factor proportions yet a growing advantage for incumbent legislators when they seek reelection.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemSSWP 159
Additional Information:© 1978 North-Holland Publishing Company. The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions on an earlier draft from James Buchanan, Bruce Cain, John Jackson, Julius Margolis, Alan Peacock, Sam Peltzman, Barry Weingast and an anonymous referee. Formerly SSWP 159.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-163537758
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83323
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:22 Nov 2017 17:22
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:57

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