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A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide

Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1982) A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 36 (2). pp. 253-262. ISSN 0022-3239. doi:10.1007/BF00933832.

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It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with those in closed-loop strategies. This note identifies a class of differential games in which the Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies is degenerate, in the sense that it depends on time only. Consequently, the closed-loop equilibrium is also an equilibrium in open-loop strategies.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemSSWP 333
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ContributionOther Contributors NameIdentifierPersonID (may be blank)
OtherLeitmann, G.Leitmann-GUNSPECIFIED
Additional Information:© Plenum Publishing Corporation 1982. Communicated by G. Leitmann. The helpful comments of Professors Y. C. Ho, G. Leitmann, H. Y. Wan, Jr., and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Formerly SSWP 333.
Subject Keywords:Differential games, Nash equilibria, open-loop strategies, closed-loop strategies
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-170436020
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83326
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Nov 2017 22:36
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:57

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