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Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts

Green, Jerry R. and Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1992) Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts. Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, 25-26 . pp. 123-150. ISSN 2115-4430. doi:10.2307/20075860.

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Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the parties recognize that the uncertain event will be common knowledge for them, and that they will be able to renegotiate the contract voluntarily, provided that they both gain in doing so. When structuring the original contract they can foresee this renegotiation phase. Efficient contracts are those that perform best, when taking this into account. This paper studies the form of such efficient contracts. It is shown that it is always better to have a contract than it is to have none, no matter which party has the preponderence of bargaining strength in the renegotiation phase. We also study whether renegotiation can substitute completely for the absence of contingent contracts. We characterize a family of cases where it can. And we present some "second-best" results in others, where it cannot.

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Additional Information:© 1992 published by GENES on behalf of ADRES. This research was supported by National Science Foundation grant number IRI-85-07291. The authors thank Michael Whinston and John Moore for comments on the earlier version.
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Official Citation:Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. “Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts.” Annales D'Économie Et De Statistique, no. 25/26, 1992, pp. 123–150. JSTOR,
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83345
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:20 Nov 2017 21:53
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:57

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