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A formal theory of lobbying behavior

Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1983) A formal theory of lobbying behavior. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 4 (1). pp. 71-84. ISSN 0143-2087. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-150131003

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Abstract

This paper analyses strategic lobbying behaviour under the assumption of disorganized opposition. A dynamic programming approach is used. The optimal rate of lobbying expenditure is shown to be an increasing function of time. A specific example is computed to determine the influence of various parameters. Next, the case of lobbying against an active counterlobby is considered in a dynamic game-theoretic framework. The Nash equilibrium rates of lobbying expenditure are computed for a specific example with symmetric players. The equilibrium rates of expenditure for the two lobbyists may be either everywhere increasing, everywhere decreasing, or single peaked as a function of time. In addition, some comparative statics results are reversed relative to those of the disorganized opposition model.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1002/oca.4660040106DOIArticle
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/oca.4660040106/abstractPublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-140612623Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1983 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 14 July 1982. Formerly SSWP 302
Subject Keywords:optimal lobbying models, dynamic programming, differential games, Nash equilibrium
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-150131003
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-150131003
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83361
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Nov 2017 23:11
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:05

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