Cass, David and Okuno, Masahiro and Zilcha, Itzhak (1979) The role of money in supporting the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibrium in consumption-loan type models. Journal of Economic Theory, 20 (1). pp. 41-80. ISSN 0022-0531. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90062-0. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-163025356
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Abstract
Perhaps the single most enduring theme in economics is that of the social desirability of the competitive mechanism. In its modern form, this theme occurs as the two basic theorems of welfare economics (see, in particular, Arrow). Our central concern in this paper is with the validity of the first of these two theorems—that every competitive equilibrium yields a Pareto optimal allocation—in idealized yet plausible models of intertemporal allocation in a market economy.
Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
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Additional Information: | Received December 10, 1978. This paper was prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Conference on Models of Monetary Economies, held December 7–8, 1978. Research support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Formerly SSWP 242. | ||||||||||||
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Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90062-0 | ||||||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-163025356 | ||||||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-163025356 | ||||||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
ID Code: | 83375 | ||||||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||||||||
Deposited On: | 21 Nov 2017 18:16 | ||||||||||||
Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 19:57 |
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