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Toward a theory of legislative decision

Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P. and Weisberg, Herbert F. (1978) Toward a theory of legislative decision. In: Game Theory and Political Science. Studies in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics. No.3. New York University Press , New York, pp. 165-190. ISBN 9780814761564.

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Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory.

Item Type:Book Section
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Additional Information:© 1978 by New York University Press. Formerly SSWP 206.
Series Name:Studies in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-140049018
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83405
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:22 Nov 2017 17:51
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:06

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