Cohen, Linda (1979) Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models. Journal of Economic Theory, 20 (1). pp. 1-12. ISSN 0022-0531. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90059-0. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-152137219
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Abstract
Simple majority rule usually does not yield an unambiguous consistent outcome. Assuming a characterization of the set of potential outcomes as R^n and an odd number of voters with quasi-concave preferences, a unique, nonempty set of majority rule cycles exists. Sufficient conditions are established for the top cycle set to encompass the entire policy space. Generalized quadratic utility functions satisfy these conditions.
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1979 by Academic Press, Inc. Received March 22, 1977; revised June 2, 1978. I wish to thank John Ferejohn and my colleagues in the 1977 California Institute of Technology Social Science workshop. I especially thank Charles Plott and Richard McKelvey for commenting on earlier versions. Formerly SSWP 172. | ||||||||||||
| Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90059-0 | ||||||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-152137219 | ||||||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-152137219 | ||||||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
| ID Code: | 83411 | ||||||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||||||||
| Deposited On: | 22 Nov 2017 17:28 | ||||||||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 19:57 |
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