Ferejohn, John A. and Fishburn, Peter C. (1979) Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures. Journal of Economic Theory, 21 (1). p. 28. ISSN 0022-0531. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-154516353
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Abstract
This paper is motivated by two apparently dissimilar deficiencies in the theory of social choice and the theory of cooperative games. Both deficiencies stem from what we regard as an inadequate conception of decisiveness or coalitional power. Our main purpose will be to present a more general concept of decisiveness and to show that this notion allows us to characterize broad classes of games and social choice procedures.
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1979 Academic Press. Received July 28, 1977. Formerly SSWP 168. | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-154516353 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-154516353 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 83413 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 22 Nov 2017 17:48 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 19:06 |
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