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Quantal response equilibria for normal form games

McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1). pp. 6-38. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023.

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We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility and assume other players do so as well. We define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum likelihood estimation.

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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1995 Academic Press. Received March 18, 1994. We acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. We thank Barry O'Neill, Richard Boebel, Jack Ochs, and Amnon Rapoport for sharing their data. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments at several conference and seminar presentations, suggestions by a referee, and the research assistance of Yan Chen and Eugene Grayver. Formerly SSWP 883.
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JPL-Caltech supercomputer projectUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL: C19, C44, C72, C92
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-164515991
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83557
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:29 Nov 2017 23:46
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 20:12

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