McAfee, R. Preston (1992) A dominant strategy double auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 56 (2). pp. 434-450. ISSN 0022-0531. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(92)90091-U. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-171012049
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Abstract
A double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed. This mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer's bid double auction. In addition, the mechanism always produces full information first best prices; the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism. The mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices.
| Item Type: | Article | |||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1992 Academic Press, Inc. Received November 19, 1990; revised June 11, 1991. I benefited from discussions with Kim Border, Mark Satterthwaite, and Sanjay Srivastava, the comments of Steve Williams, and from the advice of Martin Hellwig and two anonymous referees. Formerly SSWP 734. | |||||||||
| Issue or Number: | 2 | |||||||||
| Classification Code: | JEL: D44, D62 | |||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90091-U | |||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-171012049 | |||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-171012049 | |||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | |||||||||
| ID Code: | 83559 | |||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | |||||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | |||||||||
| Deposited On: | 29 Nov 2017 20:05 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 20:12 |
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