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Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement

Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1990) Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement. Social Science Working Paper, 731. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140721592

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Abstract

In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo alternative. If the payoffs in the status quo depend on strategic actions based on the players' beliefs, then the inferences players make in the event someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints. We include this possibility for learning from disagreement by modeling the mechanism design problem as a ratification game in which privately informed players simultaneously vote for or against the proposed mechanism. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of this inferencing problem in a consistent way. Requiring a mechanism to be ratifiable can either strengthen or weaken the standard participation constraints that arise in mechanism design problems.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145049106Related ItemPublished Article
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:We thank Jeff Banks, Steve Matthews, Preston McAfee, Joel Sobel, and numerous seminar participants for valuable comments. We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for support.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Funding AgencyGrant Number
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Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:731
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140721592
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140721592
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83606
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:30 Nov 2017 22:17
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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