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Electing Legislatures

Austen-Smith, David (1996) Electing Legislatures. In: Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series. No.50. Springer , Dordrecht, pp. 113-148. ISBN 978-0-7923-9711-3.

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Policy outcomes in representative democracies arise out of legislative decision-making, and out of legislatures that consist of more than one elected official. The preferences of policy-oriented voters over possible representatives, therefore, will be induced both by their preferences over policy outcomes and the institutional structure of legislative decision-making. This observation is, I believe, fundamental to developing models, and to an understanding of the election of legislatures. Models of elected legislatures that assume, at the outset, individuals who vote on the basis of the policy positions of the available candidates, without regard to the legislative implications of their vote, misspecify both individual payoffs and the choice set.

Item Type:Book Section
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Additional Information:© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1996. Formerly SSWP 644.
Series Name:Recent Economic Thought Series
Issue or Number:50
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-145454421
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83610
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Dec 2017 18:28
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 20:12

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