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How markets for impure public goods organize: The case of household refuse collection

Dubin, Jeffrey A. and Navarro, Peter (1988) How markets for impure public goods organize: The case of household refuse collection. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (2). p. 217. ISSN 8756-6222.

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Additional Information:© 1988 by Yale University. The authors acknowledge the useful comments of Richard Carson, D. Roderick Kiewiet, Lawrence Rothenberg, Charles Plott, Louis Wilde, and two anonymous referees. The University of San Diego provided generous financial support. Additional financial assistance was provided by the Exxon Foundation through the California Institute of Technology Environmental Quality Laboratory. Formerly SSWP 633
Group:Environmental Quality Laboratory
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University of San DiegoUNSPECIFIED
Exxon FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Environmental Quality LaboratoryUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-150603980
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83611
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Dec 2017 18:26
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:08

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