Published May 1982
| Version Published
Journal Article
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A dynamic game of R and D: Patent protection and competitive behavior
Creators
Abstract
A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the Nash equilibrium in investment rules.
Additional Information
© 1982 The Econometric Society. Manuscript received August, 1979; revision received May, 1981. This paper is based on sections of my doctoral dissertation. I would like to thank Morton I. Kamien, Nancy L. Schwartz, and John Roberts for their comments and encouragement. Formerly SSWP 289.Attached Files
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- Eprint ID
- 83617
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-165630210
Related works
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- http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912607 (URL)
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2017-12-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field