Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1982) A dynamic game of R and D: Patent protection and competitive behavior. Econometrica, 50 (3). pp. 671-688. ISSN 0012-9682. doi:10.2307/1912607. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-165630210
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Abstract
A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the Nash equilibrium in investment rules.
Item Type: | Article | |||||||||
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Additional Information: | © 1982 The Econometric Society. Manuscript received August, 1979; revision received May, 1981. This paper is based on sections of my doctoral dissertation. I would like to thank Morton I. Kamien, Nancy L. Schwartz, and John Roberts for their comments and encouragement. Formerly SSWP 289. | |||||||||
Subject Keywords: | Nash equilibrium, Patents, Technological innovation, Rivalry, Research and development, Knowledge acquisition, Present value, Differential games, Game theory, Dynamic games | |||||||||
Issue or Number: | 3 | |||||||||
DOI: | 10.2307/1912607 | |||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-165630210 | |||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-165630210 | |||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | |||||||||
ID Code: | 83617 | |||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | |||||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | |||||||||
Deposited On: | 01 Dec 2017 18:12 | |||||||||
Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 20:12 |
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