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A dynamic game of R and D: Patent protection and competitive behavior

Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1982) A dynamic game of R and D: Patent protection and competitive behavior. Econometrica, 50 (3). pp. 671-688. ISSN 0012-9682. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-165630210

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Abstract

A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the Nash equilibrium in investment rules.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.2307/1912607DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912607JSTORArticle
Additional Information:© 1982 The Econometric Society. Manuscript received August, 1979; revision received May, 1981. This paper is based on sections of my doctoral dissertation. I would like to thank Morton I. Kamien, Nancy L. Schwartz, and John Roberts for their comments and encouragement. Formerly SSWP 289.
Subject Keywords:Nash equilibrium, Patents, Technological innovation, Rivalry, Research and development, Knowledge acquisition, Present value, Differential games, Game theory, Dynamic games
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-165630210
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-165630210
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83617
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Dec 2017 18:12
Last Modified:01 Dec 2017 18:12

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