Ferejohn, John A. and Grether, David M. (1982) On the properties of stable decision procedures. In: Political Equlibrium. Studies in Public Choice. No.4. Springer , Boston, MA, pp. 107-117. ISBN 978-94-009-7382-4. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-160631068
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Abstract
Nonunanimous voting processes seldom possess voting equilibria if the number of alternatives is large. The discovery of this fact has led to an intense search for new “solution concepts” for voting games that are capable of predicting outcomes in cases in which equilibria fail to exist. The reader is referred to papers by Kramer (1977), Fiorina and Shepsle (this volume), and Riker (this volume) for examples and further discussion.
| Item Type: | Book Section | |||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing 1982. Formerly SSWP 210. | |||||||||
| Series Name: | Studies in Public Choice | |||||||||
| Issue or Number: | 4 | |||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_8 | |||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-160631068 | |||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-160631068 | |||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | |||||||||
| ID Code: | 83642 | |||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | |||||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | |||||||||
| Deposited On: | 21 Dec 2017 18:34 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 20:12 |
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