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Nonequilibrium solutions for legislative systems

Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P. and Packel, Edward W. (1980) Nonequilibrium solutions for legislative systems. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 25 (2). pp. 140-148. ISSN 1099-1743. doi:10.1002/bs.3830250206.

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It is well known that group decision processes (of which voting processes are an important special case) do not in general have equilibria. In fact, recent work indicates that such processes are characterized by a degree of instability much more extensive than previously recognized. As observers of ongoing political processes, we contend that such instability results simply do not describe real world politics. As an alternative, we propose a nonequilibrium model which assigns a probability distribution to the objects of political decision. Although this Markov model is based on several specific propositions about the process by which legislative bodies move from one position to another, our theoretical results do not depend on these specific propositions: Given alternative substantive assumptions, our model would produce different predictions about outcomes. This version of the model, however, successfully simulates the results of a series of experiments performed several years ago.

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Additional Information:© 1980 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Manuscript Received: 10 January 1979. Manuscript Revised: 6 June 1979. Research on this proposal was partially supported by the National Science Foundation Grants soc 79-07366 and soc 78-24787. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1987 Public Choice Meetings, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 3-5, 1978. Formerly SSWP 202.
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Subject Keywords:group; decision making; decider; supporter; stochastic solution; Markov chain; voting experiments; ergodic sets; core; Monte Carlo simulation
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-164050230
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83645
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:03 Jan 2018 00:42
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 20:12

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