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Voters, legislators and bureaucracy: Institutional design in the public sector

Fiorina, Morris P. and Noll, Roger G. (1978) Voters, legislators and bureaucracy: Institutional design in the public sector. American Economic Review, 68 (2). pp. 256-260. ISSN 0002-8282.

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The purpose of this paper is to outline a theory of representative democracy which explains why rational actors construct an excessively bureaucratized government. We define excessive bureaucratization as the selection of an inefficient production technology for the public sector, characterized by relative factor proportions that entail more bureaucracy than the proportions that would minimize total costs. Thus, the question of excessive bureaucracy is related to but conceptually different from whether a particular policy is worthwhile. Furthermore, it presumes a concern more fundamental than the observation that implementing a public policy inevitably requires the expenditure of scarce resources.

Item Type:Article
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Additional Information:© 1978 American Economic Association. Formerly SSWP 194.
Subject Keywords:Government bureaucracy, Legislators, Incumbents, Voting, Political parties, Public sector, Public policy, Group facilitation, Congressional elections, Congressional districts
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171204-133249663
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83661
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:03 Jan 2018 00:37
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:09

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