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The economic theory of a professional sports league

Quirk, James P. and El-Hodiri, Mohamed M. (1974) The economic theory of a professional sports league. In: Government and the Sports Business: Papers Prepared for a Conference of Experts, with an Introduction and Summary. Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity. No.8. Brookings Institution , Washington DC, pp. 33-80. ISBN 0815761066. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171207-155835246

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Abstract

This chapter applies economic theory to the analysis of the business operations of a professional sports league. Special emphasis is given to the implications of the player reservation system-the rules structure for the distribution of playing strengths among the teams in a league-since partisans of professional sports claim that this system is essential to the goal of "equalizing competitive playing strengths" among teams.


Item Type:Book Section
Alternate Title:On the Economic Theory of Professional Sports League
Additional Information:© 1974 by the Brookings Institution. The results presented here are extensions of those reported in an earlier paper, Mohamed El Hodiri and James Quirk, "An Economic Model of a Professional Sports," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 79 (November-December 1971), pp. 1302-19, which in turn was stimulated by the pioneering work of Simon Rottenberg (see "The Baseball Players' Labor Market," ibid., Vol. 64 [June 1956], pp. 242-58). Formerly Social Science Working Paper 1. Entitled "On the Economic Theory of Professional Sports League" in SSWP.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper1
Series Name:Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity
Issue or Number:8
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171207-155835246
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171207-155835246
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83745
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:21 Dec 2017 18:36
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:10

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