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A dynamic school choice model

Pereyra, Juan Sebastián (2011) A dynamic school choice model. Social Science Working Paper, 1347. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, we introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, agents are allowed either to retain their current position or to choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a fair matching always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:This paper constitutes the first chapter of my Ph.D dissertation at El Colegio de Mexico. It is written under the supervision of David Cantala within the CONACYT project 62188. I am also grateful to Jordi Massso, Szilvia Papai, Federico Echenique, Christine Daley, Kaniska Dam, Alexander Elbittar, Rafael Treibich, Francis Bloch, Emerson Melo, SangMok Lee, Fuhito Kojima, Edwin van Gameren, Juan Gabriel Brida, Juliana Xavier, Andres Sambarino and Rodrigo Velez for their comments and suggestions and the seminar participants at Ecole Polytechnique, Economics Department at Universidad de la Republica de Uruguay and El Colegio de Mexico for discussions. All errors are my responsibility. Published as Pereyra, Juan Sebastián. "A dynamic school choice model." Games and economic behavior 80 (2013): 100-114.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT)62188
Subject Keywords:School choice; Overlapping agents; Dynamic matching; Deferred acceptance algorithm
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1347
Classification Code:JEL: C71; C78; D71; D78; I28
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-153020150
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83766
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Dec 2017 00:30
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:10

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