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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2012) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41 (2). pp. 331-343. ISSN 0020-7276. doi:10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4.

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We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities. In other words, the game is non-zero sum because colonels have asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations. We characterize the colonels’ payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.

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Additional Information:© Springer-Verlag 2011. Accepted: 25 May 2011 / Published online: 18 June 2011. We thank Antonio Cabrales, Tom Palfrey, Antoni Rubi and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Formerly SSWP 1335.
Subject Keywords:Colonel Blotto. Non-zero sum, Multi-dimensional resource allocation
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL: C72, D7, P16
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-160257129
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83770
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Dec 2017 23:14
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 20:13

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