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On the nature of competition in alternative electoral systems

Iaryczower, Matias and Mattozzi, Andrea (2013) On the nature of competition in alternative electoral systems. Journal of Politics, 75 (3). pp. 743-756. ISSN 0022-3816.

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We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of candidates running for public office and their ideological differentiation. We show that proportional elections have more candidates, competing less aggressively in campaign spending, than those in majoritarian elections. Candidates’ ideological positions, however, can in general be more differentiated in majoritarian or proportional elections. We also study the equilibrium effects of plurality premiums and the consequences of heterogeneity among candidates in nonideological characteristics.

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Additional Information:© Southern Political Science Association, 2013. Mattozzi acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation, SES-0617901 and from Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Grant ECO2011-28822. An online appendix with supplementary material for this article is available at We thank Juan Carrillo, Federico Echenique, Zucchero Fornaciari, Daniela Iorio, Alessandro Lizzeri, Matthias Messner, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, the editors and three anonymous reviewers. We also thank numerous seminar participants at various institutions for helpful comments to previous versions of this article. An earlier version was circulated under the title "Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems." Formerly SSWP 1285.
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Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (MINECO)ECO2011-28822
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-162955317
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83772
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Dec 2017 21:22
Last Modified:26 Apr 2019 21:04

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