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Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting

Hummel, Patrick (2008) Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 31 (2). pp. 257-269. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/s00355-007-0278-4. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-132243745

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Abstract

This paper describes the correspondences between the results given by backward induction (BI) and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) in binary voting agendas with sequential voting. When the voters have strict preferences over all candidates, the strategies that survive IEWDS all select the unique candidate selected by the BI strategy profiles. But if some voters are indifferent, this result no longer holds. However, when there are only two candidates, it is possible to demonstrate strong relationships between the results given by BI and IEWDS, even when some voters have indifferences.


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https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0278-4DOIArticle
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-007-0278-4PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-134301462Related ItemWorking Paper
http://rdcu.be/CSGwPublisherFree ReadCube access
Additional Information:© Springer-Verlag 2007. Received: 22 July 2006 / Accepted: 1 September 2007 / Published online: 22 September 2007. I thank John Duggan and Federico Echenique for comments and the Caltech SURF program for support. Formerly SSWP 1236.
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Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship (SURF)UNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
DOI:10.1007/s00355-007-0278-4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-132243745
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-132243745
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83805
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Dec 2017 19:07
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 20:14

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