Eguia, Jon X. (2007) Citizen candidates under uncertainty. Social Choice and Welfare, 29 (2). pp. 317-331. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-133303625
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Abstract
In this paper I add uncertainty about the total vote count to a “citizen candidate” model of representative democracy. I show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate.
| Item Type: | Article | |||||||||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © Springer-Verlag 2006. Received: 17 January 2006 / Accepted: 6 October 2006 / Published online: 9 November 2006. This work has benefited from valuable comments by Paul Healy, Morgan Kousser, Alejandro Saporiti, Al Slivinski, participants in a seminar in Princeton, and especially by Matt Jackson and Tom Palfrey. Their contribution is gratefully acknowledged. Formerly SSWP 1233. | |||||||||||||||
| Issue or Number: | 2 | |||||||||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y | |||||||||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-133303625 | |||||||||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-133303625 | |||||||||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | |||||||||||||||
| ID Code: | 83807 | |||||||||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | |||||||||||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | |||||||||||||||
| Deposited On: | 20 Dec 2017 19:04 | |||||||||||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 20:14 |
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