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Consistent representative democracy

Chambers, Christopher P. (2008) Consistent representative democracy. Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (2). pp. 348-363. ISSN 0899-8256. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-134829793

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Abstract

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.003DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825607000991PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-093454389Related ItemWorking Paper
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Chambers, Christopher P.0000-0001-8253-0328
Additional Information:© 2007 Elsevier Inc. Received 12 July 2006; Available online 6 July 2007. I would like to thank John Duggan, Larry Epstein, Biung-Ghi Ju, Roger Lagunoff, Leonardo Martinez, Francesco Squintani, and William Thomson for useful conversations. The associate editor and two anonymous referees also provided valuable comments. All errors are my own. Formerly SSWP 1217.
Subject Keywords:Social choice; Representative systems; Majority rule; Gerrymandering
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL: D63; D70
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-134829793
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-134829793
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:83810
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Dec 2017 18:22
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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