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Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

Casey, Peter Colum and Wierman, Mark J. and Gibilisco, Michael B. and Mordeson, John N. and Clark, Terry D. (2012) Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences. Public Choice, 151 (3-4). pp. 409-423. ISSN 0048-5829. doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1.

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The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.

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Additional Information:© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. Received: 22 August 2009. Accepted: 8 December 2010. Published online: 22 December 2010. A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Public Choice Society held in Las Vegas, Nevada, in March 2009. It was based in part on a paper making use of a conventional Euclidean veto player analysis that was presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois in April 2008. The authors express their appreciation to Ms. Selwa Nasser Ahmad, a research assistant and 2009 graduate of the MA program in international relations at Creighton University, for her assistance in obtaining text documents for parties in the Iraqi Council of Representatives.
Subject Keywords:Fuzzy set theory Fuzzy spatial models Veto players theory Government formation process Iraq
Issue or Number:3-4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20180116-085005104
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Official Citation:Casey, P.C., Wierman, M.J., Gibilisco, M.B. et al. Public Choice (2012) 151: 409.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:84325
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:17 Jan 2018 18:44
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 20:18

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