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Decentralization and the Gamble for Unity

Gibilisco, Michael (2016) Decentralization and the Gamble for Unity. . (Submitted)

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I reconcile competing accounts of decentralization and its effect on secessionist mobilization by endogenizing the regional minority’s grievance level in a dynamic framework. I demonstrate that decentralized institutions may have higher rates of minority unrest than their more centralized counterparts, and vice versa. Federations with moderate levels of power-sharing arrangements are particularly prone to secessionist violence. Even optimally chosen levels of decentralization can be followed by outbursts of minority protest or rebellion as the government subsequently refrains from repression in order to generate enough good will for a lasting peace. More broadly, grievances have a non-monotonic relationship with the onset and duration of secessionist conflict, which is one explanation for their elusive relationship in the greed versus grievance debate.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20180116-103533715
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:84341
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:17 Jan 2018 18:08
Last Modified:21 Aug 2021 14:43

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