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An Axiomatic Theory of Inductive Inference

Pomatto, Luciano and Sandroni, Alvaro (2018) An Axiomatic Theory of Inductive Inference. Philosophy of Science, 85 (2). pp. 293-315. ISSN 0031-8248. doi:10.1086/696386.

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This article develops an axiomatic theory of induction that speaks to the recent debate on Bayesian orgulity. It shows the exact principles associated with the belief that data can corroborate universal laws. We identify two types of disbelief about induction: skepticism that the existence of universal laws of nature can be determined empirically, and skepticism that the true law of nature, if it exists, can be successfully identified. We formalize and characterize these two dispositions toward induction by introducing novel axioms for subjective probabilities. We also relate these dispositions to the (controversial) axiom of σ-additivity.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription Paper
Pomatto, Luciano0000-0002-4331-8436
Additional Information:© 2018 University of Chicago Press. Received: Nov 2016; Revised: Mar 2017. We are grateful to Nabil Al-Najjar, Frederick Eberhardt and Alvaro Riascos. All remaining errors are our own.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20180425-110409545
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Official Citation:Luciano Pomatto and Alvaro Sandroni, "An Axiomatic Theory of Inductive Inference," Philosophy of Science 85, no. 2 (April 2018): 293-315.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:86032
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:25 Apr 2018 18:10
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 20:34

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