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Empirical Evidence of Overbidding in M&A Contests

de Bodt, Eric and Cousin, Jean-Gabriel and Roll, Richard (2018) Empirical Evidence of Overbidding in M&A Contests. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53 (4). pp. 1547-1579. ISSN 0022-1090. doi:10.1017/S0022109018000273.

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Surprisingly few papers have attempted to develop a direct empirical test for overbidding in merger and acquisition contests. We develop such a test grounded on a necessary condition for profit-maximizing bidding behavior. The test is not subject to endogeneity concerns. Our results strongly support the existence of overbidding. We provide evidence that overbidding is related to conflicts of interest, but also some indirect evidence that it arises from failing to fully account for the winner’s curse.

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Additional Information:© 2018 Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington. Published online: 06 August 2018. The authors address special thanks to Sanjay Bhagat (the referee) for numerous and excellent comments and suggestions, François Derrien, Espen Eckbo, Jarrad Harford (the editor), and Karin Thorburn for their helpful comments, as well as participants at the 2015 Dauphine Finance Seminar, the 2015 European Center for Governance and Control Studies Monday Finance Seminar, the 2015 French Finance Association conference, the 2014 Belgian Corporate Finance Day, and the 2015 European Financial Management Association conference. This research was carried out while the first author was Visiting Associate in Finance at the California Institute of Technology Division of Humanities and Social Sciences.
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20180822-105611868
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Official Citation:De Bodt, E., Cousin, J., & Roll, R. (2018). Empirical Evidence of Overbidding in M&A Contests. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(4), 1547-1579. doi:10.1017/S0022109018000273
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:89022
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:22 Aug 2018 18:22
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 00:31

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