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Beating the best Nash without regret

Ligett, Katrina and Piliouras, Georgios (2011) Beating the best Nash without regret. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 10 (1). pp. 23-26. ISSN 1551-9031.

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Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, despite its prominent role, has been the subject of much criticism for being too optimistic. Indeed, in general games, natural play need not converge to Nash equilibria. In games with multiple equilibria, it is unclear how players are expected to coordinate; even in games with a unique equilibrium, finding it may involve unreasonable expectations on player communication or computation.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription
Ligett, Katrina0000-0003-2780-6656
Additional Information:© 2011 ACM. Katrina Ligett's work was supported in part by NSF grants 0937060 and DMS-1004416. Georgios Piliouras' work was supported by NSF grants CCF-0325453, AF-0910940, AFOSR grant FA9550-09-1-0420 and ONR grant N00014-09-1-0751.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)FA9550-09-1-0420
Office of Naval Research (ONR)N00014-09-1-0751
Subject Keywords:game theory, learning, Nash equilibria, regret minimization
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190111-090750274
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:92212
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:11 Jan 2019 17:43
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 20:42

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