Ligett, Katrina and Piliouras, Georgios (2011) Beating the best Nash without regret. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 10 (1). pp. 23-26. ISSN 1551-9031. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190111-090750274
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Abstract
Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, despite its prominent role, has been the subject of much criticism for being too optimistic. Indeed, in general games, natural play need not converge to Nash equilibria. In games with multiple equilibria, it is unclear how players are expected to coordinate; even in games with a unique equilibrium, finding it may involve unreasonable expectations on player communication or computation.
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Additional Information: | © 2011 ACM. Katrina Ligett's work was supported in part by NSF grants 0937060 and DMS-1004416. Georgios Piliouras' work was supported by NSF grants CCF-0325453, AF-0910940, AFOSR grant FA9550-09-1-0420 and ONR grant N00014-09-1-0751. | ||||||||||||||
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Subject Keywords: | game theory, learning, Nash equilibria, regret minimization | ||||||||||||||
Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20190111-090750274 | ||||||||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190111-090750274 | ||||||||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||||
ID Code: | 92212 | ||||||||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||||
Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||||||||||
Deposited On: | 11 Jan 2019 17:43 | ||||||||||||||
Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 20:42 |
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