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Hurford's partial vindication of classical empiricism

Cowie, Fiona (2003) Hurford's partial vindication of classical empiricism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26 (3). pp. 289-290. ISSN 0140-525X. doi:10.1017/S0140525X03290075. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190211-093501426

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Abstract

Hurford's discussion also vindicates the classical empiricist program in semantics. The idea that PREDICATE(x) is the logical form of the sensory representations encoded via the dorsal and ventral streams validates empiricists' insistence on the psychological primacy of sense data, which have the same form. In addition to knowing the logical form of our primitive representations, however, we need accounts of (1) their contents and (2) how more complex thoughts are derived from them. Ideally, our semantic vocabulary would both reflect the psychological “primitiveness” of these representations and make clear how more complex representations derive from them.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X03290075DOIArticle
Additional Information:© 2003 Cambridge University Press. Published online: 01 June 2003.
Issue or Number:3
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X03290075
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190211-093501426
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190211-093501426
Official Citation:Cowie, F. (2003). Hurford's partial vindication of classical empiricism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(3), 289-290. doi:10.1017/S0140525X03290075
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:92825
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:12 Feb 2019 22:20
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 03:53

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