Cowie, Fiona (2003) Hurford's partial vindication of classical empiricism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26 (3). pp. 289-290. ISSN 0140-525X. doi:10.1017/S0140525X03290075. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190211-093501426
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Abstract
Hurford's discussion also vindicates the classical empiricist program in semantics. The idea that PREDICATE(x) is the logical form of the sensory representations encoded via the dorsal and ventral streams validates empiricists' insistence on the psychological primacy of sense data, which have the same form. In addition to knowing the logical form of our primitive representations, however, we need accounts of (1) their contents and (2) how more complex thoughts are derived from them. Ideally, our semantic vocabulary would both reflect the psychological “primitiveness” of these representations and make clear how more complex representations derive from them.
Item Type: | Article | ||||||
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Additional Information: | © 2003 Cambridge University Press. Published online: 01 June 2003. | ||||||
Issue or Number: | 3 | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1017/S0140525X03290075 | ||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20190211-093501426 | ||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190211-093501426 | ||||||
Official Citation: | Cowie, F. (2003). Hurford's partial vindication of classical empiricism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(3), 289-290. doi:10.1017/S0140525X03290075 | ||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
ID Code: | 92825 | ||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||
Deposited On: | 12 Feb 2019 22:20 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 16 Nov 2021 03:53 |
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