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Distributed welfare games with applications to sensor coverage

Marden, Jason R. and Wierman, Adam (2008) Distributed welfare games with applications to sensor coverage. In: 47th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. IEEE , Piscataway, NJ, pp. 1708-1713. ISBN 978-1-4244-3124-3. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190301-134129242

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Abstract

Traditionally resource allocation problems are approached in a centralized manner; however, often centralized control is impossible. We consider a distributed, non-cooperative approach to resource allocation. In particular, we consider the situation where the global planner does not have the authority to assign players to resources; rather, players are self-interested. The question that emerges is how can the global planner entice the players to settle on a desirable allocation with respect to the global welfare? To study this question, we focus on a class of games that we refer to as distributed welfare games. Within this context, we investigate how the global planner should distribute the global welfare to the players. We measure the efficacy of a distribution rule in two ways: (i) Does a pure Nash equilibrium exist? (ii) How efficient are the Nash equilibria as compared with the global optimum? We derive sufficient conditions on the distribution rule that ensures the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in any single-selection distributed welfare game. Furthermore, we derive bounds on the efficiency of these distribution rules in a variety of settings. Lastly, we highlight the implications of these results in the context of the sensor coverage problem.


Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2008.4738800DOIArticle
Additional Information:© 2008 IEEE. The journal version of this paper is [1]. All omitted proofs can be found in [1]. This work was supported by Microsoft Research and both the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory and the Lee Center for Advanced Networking at California Institute of Technology. Additionally, we would like to acknowledge the insights that came from many discussions with Sherwin Doroudi and Kenneth McKell.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Microsoft ResearchUNSPECIFIED
Caltech Social and Information Sciences LaboratoryUNSPECIFIED
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
DOI:10.1109/CDC.2008.4738800
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190301-134129242
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190301-134129242
Official Citation:J. R. Marden and A. Wierman, "Distributed welfare games with applications to sensor coverage," 2008 47th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Cancun, 2008, pp. 1708-1713. doi: 10.1109/CDC.2008.4738800
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:93396
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:01 Mar 2019 23:06
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 16:57

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