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A Quantum-Proof Non-Malleable Extractor, With Application to Privacy Amplification against Active Quantum Adversaries

Aggarwal, Divesh and Chung, Kai-Min and Lin, Han-Hsuan and Vidick, Thomas (2019) A Quantum-Proof Non-Malleable Extractor, With Application to Privacy Amplification against Active Quantum Adversaries. In: Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. No.11477. Springer , Cham, pp. 442-469. ISBN 978-3-030-17655-6. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190320-102401828

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Abstract

In privacy amplification, two mutually trusted parties aim to amplify the secrecy of an initial shared secret X in order to establish a shared private key K by exchanging messages over an insecure communication channel. If the channel is authenticated the task can be solved in a single round of communication using a strong randomness extractor; choosing a quantum-proof extractor allows one to establish security against quantum adversaries. In the case that the channel is not authenticated, this simple solution is no longer secure. Nevertheless, Dodis and Wichs (STOC’09) showed that the problem can be solved in two rounds of communication using a non-malleable extractor, a stronger pseudo-random construction than a strong extractor. We give the first construction of a non-malleable extractor that is secure against quantum adversaries. The extractor is based on a construction by Li (FOCS’12), and is able to extract from source of min-entropy rates larger than 1 / 2. Combining this construction with a quantum-proof variant of the reduction of Dodis and Wichs, due to Cohen and Vidick (unpublished) we obtain the first privacy amplification protocol secure against active quantum adversaries.


Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_16DOIArticle
https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.00557arXivDiscussion Paper
https://rdcu.be/b5WorPublisherFree ReadCube access
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Vidick, Thomas0000-0002-6405-365X
Additional Information:© 2019 International Association for Cryptologic Research. First Online: 24 April 2019. D. Aggarwal—This research was further partially funded by the Singapore Ministry of Education and the National Research Foundation under grant R-710-000-012-135. K.-M. Chung—This research is partially supported by the 2016 Academia Sinica Career Development Award under Grant no. 23-17, and MOST QC project under Grant no. MOST 107-2627-E-002-002. H.-H. Lin—This material is based on work supported by the Singapore National Research Foundation under NRF RF Award No. NRF-NRFF2013-13. T. Vidick—Supported by NSF CAREER Grant CCF-1553477, AFOSR YIP award number FA9550-16-1-0495, and the IQIM, an NSF Physics Frontiers Center (NSF Grant PHY-1125565) with support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (GBMF-12500028).
Group:Institute for Quantum Information and Matter
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Ministry of Education (Singapore)UNSPECIFIED
National Research Foundation (Singapore)R-710-000-012-135
Academia Sinica23-17
Ministry of Science and Technology (Taipei)107-2627-E-002-002
National Research Foundation (Singapore)NRF-NRFF2013-13
NSFCCF-1553477
Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)FA9550-16-1-0495
Institute for Quantum Information and Matter (IQIM)UNSPECIFIED
NSFPHY-1125565
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationGBMF-12500028
Series Name:Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Issue or Number:11477
DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_16
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190320-102401828
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190320-102401828
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:93984
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:20 Mar 2019 17:35
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 17:02

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