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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O. and Watts, Alison (2005) Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games. Social Science Working Paper, 1212. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190426-133915057

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Abstract

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence under different equilibrium definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:Financial support under NSF grant SES-0316493 is gratefully acknowledged, as is support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking. We thank Federico Echenique, Jan Eeckhout, Hubert Stahn, Myrna Wooders, and the participants at the New Trends in Cooperative Game Theory and the Coalition Theory Network Workshops for helpful comments.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-0316493
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Social Games, Matching, Games, Repeated Games, Renegotiation
Classification Code:JEL: A14, C71, C72, C78, J41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190426-133915057
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190426-133915057
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:95031
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:26 Apr 2019 20:44
Last Modified:27 Apr 2019 00:47

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