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Membership in Citizen Groups

Barbieri, Stefano and Mattozzi, Andrea (2004) Membership in Citizen Groups. Social Science Working Paper, 1206. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:We would like to thank Andrew Postlewaite, Steven Matthews, Stephen Morris, George Mailath, Antonio Merlo, Julio Davila, Francis Bloch and Celso Brunetti. All usual disclaimers apply.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Public Goods, Associations, Dynamic Global Games, Heterogeneous Communities
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1206
Classification Code:JEL: C73, D71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190426-141140646
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:95034
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:26 Apr 2019 21:15
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 21:09

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