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Veto Players and Policy Entrepreneurship

Hirsch, Alexander V. and Shotts, Kenneth W. (2015) Veto Players and Policy Entrepreneurship. Social Science Working Paper, 1451. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Political institutions often use decision making procedures that create veto players—individuals or groups who, despite lacking direct decision making authority, nevertheless have the power to block policy change. In this paper we use the competitive policy development model of Hirsch and Shotts (2015) to examine how the presence of veto players effects outcomes when policies are developed endogenously. Consistent with spatial models of pivotal politics, veto players can induce gridlock, which is harmful to a centrist decisionmaker. But they can also have more subtle effects. Some of the effects are negative—for example, when the status quo is centrist, veto players dampen productive policy competition because of their resistance to change. But some of the effects are surprisingly positive. In particular, when the status quo benefits a veto player and there is a skilled policy entrepreneur who is highly motivated change it, the veto player forces the entrepreneur to develop a much higher quality proposal. This effect yields substantial benefits for a centrist decisionmaker. We also show that veto players can induce asymmetric patterns of policy development, with much greater activity by the faction that is more dissatisfied with the status quo.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:We appreciate comments on previous versions of this paper from Scott Ashworth, David Epstein, Justin Grimmer, John Huber, Craig Volden, Alan Wiseman, and audiences at Columbia, Duke PARISS, Emory CSLPE, Georgetown, Harvard/MIT Political Economy, KU Leuven, NYU, Princeton CSDP, APSA 2011, MPSA 2011, and SPSA 2012.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1451
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190430-083315475
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:95108
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Apr 2019 15:57
Last Modified:05 Feb 2021 23:52

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